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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
NINA DOREEN DAVIS BOYCE, 
Plaintiff-Appellant, 
v. 
MILAN MACK BOYCE, 
Defendant-Respondent. 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
APPELLANT'S BRIEF 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
No. 16342 
This is an action for an equitable property distribution, 
alimony, and child support payments following dissolution of the 
marriage of plaintiff-appellant and defendant-respondent. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
The Third Judicial District Court, the Honorable 
David B. Dee, presiding, denied appellant's motions to set 
aside the decree of divorce, for relief from the final decree 
and to modify the decree of divorce. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Plaintiff-appellant seeks a reversal of the Amended 
Judgment and Order of January 31, 1979 denying appellant's 
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Motion to Set Aside the Decree, Motion for Relief from Final 
Decree and Motion to Modify Divorce Decree and ordering 
appellant to remove the lis pendens previously filed by her 
in connection with this action. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Because of the complexity of the facts in this case, 
appellant will set out her Statement of Facts in two parts. 
First is a procedural overview necessitated by the volume of 
the file herein. This overview will'serve to fix the chronolog) 
involved which is unclear from the file. Second is a review of 
the facts which came to light after the entry of the Decree 
of Divorce and which show that respondent at the time of the 
divorce had fraud~lencly misled the appellant and the court 
below as to his true assets in order to prevent appellant from 
receiving her fair and equitable share of the assets of the 
parties on dissolution of the marriage. 
A. Procedural overview 
On May 27, 1977, appellant filed her Complaint in 
the Third District Court, together with a Motion for Temporary 
Support. Respondent requested a formal hearing on the above-
described Motion by way of a pleading entitled Notice, which 
was filed on June 24, 1977. 
-2-
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On July 28, 1977! appellant filed an Affidavit to 
the effect that she had no knowledge of the financial condi-
tion of respondent. By Order signed on July 28, 1977, a hearing 
requiring respondent to appear and show cause why he should not 
be required to make a full accounting of his assets and liabili-
ties was set for September 6, 1977. Respondent filed his Answer 
to appellant's Complaint on August l, 1977. 
At the hearing on the Order to Show Cause, counsel 
for respondent requested a continuance ''for the reason that 
defendant's business schedule would not allow him to appear 
on September 6, 1977." (R. 17) The hearing was continued to 
September 27, 1977 at which time appellant's Motion for Tem-
porary Support was also to be heard. 
On September 12, 1977, appellant filed her First Set 
of Interrogatories to Milan Mack Boyce. 
At the September 27th hearing, respondent testified 
that he was renting his current residence from and was paid a 
salary by Insul-Guard Corporation, of which he was president. 
When asked by his attorney who owned the corporation, respondent 
answered: 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
Well, shareholders. 
Do you own an interest in that corporation? 
I own a small interest in it, yes. 
What interest do you own? 
I don't honestly know because I have so 
many commitments out to others. 
(R. 251-252) 
~-
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As a result of this hearing, respondent was ordered to pay $400 
per month temporary support, to allow appellant the use of an 
automobile, and to maintain in force a policy of health insuran1 
for the benefit of appellant and the minor children of the part 
On December 5, 1977, appellant filed a Motion for Ord1 
Compelling Discovery or in the Alternative, Motion for Entry of 
Default Judgment. Said Motion was noticed up for hearing on 
December 21, 1977. As a result of that hearing, respondent was 
ordered to answer the Interrogatories propounded by appellant 
on or before January 11, 1978, or failing that, respondent's 
Answer would be stricken and his default entered. On December 
22, 1977, the case was set for trial on February 7, 1978, befor 
Judge David Dee. 
On January 16, 1978, respondent's Answer was stricken 
and his default entered. 
On January 31, 1978, appellant filed a Notice of 
Default Hearing, which hearing was to be held on February 1, 
1978, before Judge Marcellus K. Snow. On February 1, responden 
filed a Motion to Vacate Default. As grounds for his Motion, 
respondent represented that he had been ill and that his illnes 
had caused him to be late in responding to discovery. Responde 
incorrectly represented that he had partially responded to dis· 
covery prior to the entry of default. The record reflects that 
respondent's Response to Written Interrogatories or to Demand 
for Admissions was filed on February 1, 1978. (R. 60) On 
February 1, Judge Snow granted respondent's Hotion to Set Aside 
-4-
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Default, and further ordered "that no more continuances will be 
granted." (R. 59) 
On February 8, 1978, Mr. Gayle Dean Hunt withdrew as 
counsel for respondent, and although no entry of appearance is 
fuund inthe file, Jed W. Shields became counsel for respondent. 
On February 15, 1978, the trial in this matter was 
set for March 17, 1978. On March 14, 1978, Mr. Shields requested 
a continuance of the trial date in spite of the Order of Judge 
Snow. Counsel gave as the reason fo~ the requested continuance 
the fact that he had another trial set for March 17, and noticed 
up his motion for March 15, the day following the date of his 
motion. By Order filed March 15, 1978, Judge David B. Dee con-
tinued the trial of this case to April 7, 1978. 
By Order of Judge Dee filed March 22, 1978, respondent 
was ordered to supply more complete answers to the Interrogatories 
of appellant, said answers to be submitted by March 24, 1978. 
The file contains no record of respondent ever having complied 
with said Order; however, at a hearirtg on October 17, 1978, 
appellant indicated that she received a single sheet of paper 
through her attorney a few days prior to the April 7 trial date, 
which sheet of paper purported to be answers as compelled by 
the March 22nd Order. (R. 803 and Plaintiff's Exhibit 1.) 
By Minute Entry dated April 7, 1978, the divorce was 
granted and a settlement reached between appellant and respondent 
was read into the record. Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law 
and a Decree of Divorce were filed on May 19, 1978. On June 20, 
-5-
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1978, a Motion and Order were presented to Judge Dee which re-
cited that the Findings and Decree entered on May 19, 1978 
were erroneously entered. Therefore, new Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law and Decree of Divorce were entered on June 
22, 1978. 
On July 20, 1978, appellant filed a Motion for Relief 
from Final Decree pursuant to Rule 60(b), U.R.C.P., alleging 
(1) that she had obtained material and relevant information 
regarding the real property of the parties which could not 
have been discovered by due diligence in time to move for 
a new trial, (2) that defendant, Milan Mack Boyce, had been 
guilty of fraud, misrepresentation, or misconduct in relation 
to the divorce action, and (3) that she had entered into the 
oral stipulation for setdement while under duress. This 
Motion was scheduled by appellant to be heard on October 2, 197i 
but pursuant to a request for special setting filed by respondB 
an Order for Special Setting was signed by Judge Dee on July 27 
1978, and hearing on the Motion was set for July 31, 1978. 
On August 1, 1978, the hearing on appellant's Motion 
was heard and based upon the affidavit of appellant filed Augur 
1978 (R. 182) the divorce decree was in effect set aside, and b 
Minute Entry of the same date, Judge Dee ordered "All real pro· 
perty and cash to be restored as they were on April 7, 1978." 
(R. 162) An Order reflecting the results of the August 1, 1978 
hearing was drawn up by counsel for appellant but was never 
signed by Judge Dee. (R. 221-224) 
-6-
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
On August 17, 1978, R.M. Child entered his appearance 
as counsel for appellant. 
On approximately August 21, 1978, respondent filed 
his Petition to Set Aside the Temporary Order of the Court and 
to Restore the Decree of Divorce Herein, and an Objection to 
form of the proposed Order submitted by appellant, in which he 
protested that it would be impossible for respondent to comply 
with the Court's Order of August 1, 1978. Respondent's Petition 
and Objections came on for hearing before the Honorable Judge 
Dee on September 8, 1978. However, by reason of the fact that 
appellant had filed a Notice of Appeal contemporaneously with 
her Motion for Relief From Final Decree and Notice of Intent to 
Appeal, the file was not before the Court. 
At that hearing Judge Dee questioned his authority 
exercised on August 1, 1978 in setting aside the Divorce Decree 
by reason of the prior filing of appellant's Notice of Appeal 
(R. 149) and suggested that if appellant dismissed the appeal 
to the Supreme Court, the trial court could again assume juris-
diction to hear appellant's Motion for Relief From Final Decree. 
(R. 774, 789) 
Judge Dee further indicated that the Motion for Relief 
From Final Decree should be refiled as "a proper Rule 60(b) motion" 
(R. 788), and set the matter for hearing on October 17, 1978. 
Appellant, respondent and the Court presumed that 
appellant could not conduct discovery unless and until the Di-
vorce Decree had been set aside. From the transcript of the 
September 8, 1978 hearing the following pages contain material 
-7-
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which show that the indicated persons presumed discovery could n1 
proceed: The Court - R. 782; appellant - R. 784, 785, 786; respr 
dent - R. 781, 785, 786. From the transcript of the October 17, 
1978 hearing the following pages show the same: the Court -
R. 887; appellant - R. 886-87. (See Appendix 1 attached) 
Appellant subsequently on September 12, 1978 voluntari: 
withdrew her appeal to the Supreme Court and on September 13, 19" 
filed a Rule 60(b) Motion to Set Aside Decree (in whole or in pa1 
Commencing at 2:00p.m. on October 17, 1978, hearing 
was held before Judge Dee on the various motions which had there· 
tofore been filed by the parties. 
At the beginning of the October 17th hearing, counsel 
for respondent represented to the Court that he had an affidavit 
of some length to counter the Affidavit in Support of Motion for 
Relief from Final Decree filed by appellant on August 1, 1978. 
Counsel for respondent also represented that he had case law 
standing for the proposition that the Court had no authority to 
set aside the Decree. (R. 795) The Court invited counsel to 
submit whatever affidavits or law he might have and then permitt 
the hearing to go forward. 
At the hearing, appellant called four witnesses to 
testify and had three more prepared to testify. The purpose of 
this testimony was only to place before the Court evidence previ 
ously set forth in the affidavit of appellant upon which the Cou 
relied in indicating its intent to set aside the decree on Aug-
ust 1, 1978. The evidence and Exhibits offered by appellant at 
this hearing are more specifically referred to in the second par 
-8-
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of this Statement of Facts. 
respondent. 
No evidence was offered by the 
After approximately two hours of testimony the Court 
announced that it had another commitment. The Court stated: 
"And I've already got the feeling for whether or not this matter 
should be opened up based on the testimony so far." (R. 887-888) 
The Court gave counsel for respondent one week to 
submit a memorandum on the issue of whether the court had 
authority to set aside the Divorce Decree in whole or in part. 
(R. 889) Appellant was given leave to file reply to respondent's 
memorandum. The Court indicated that after said memorandum had 
been filed the Court would hold further hearing for argument on 
whether the Court would "open it up." (R. 887) 
On October 24, 1978, respondent filed his memorandum 
captioned "Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff's Motion to Set Aside 
Decree (in whole or in part) and Plaintiff's Motion for Relief 
From Final Decree." (R. 538) Reference was made therein to 
a counter-affidavit by respondent which was never in fact re-
ceived by appellant until December 6, 1978. Said Motion was in 
fact a Memorandum of Law which sought to establish that the 
trial court was without authority to set aside the Decree. In 
response to this Motion, appellant submitted her Memorandum in 
Support of the Court's Authority to Set Aside Decree on or about 
October 31, 1978. 
-9-
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Following this, and because respondent had made no 
child support payments since the August 1st hearing, a Request 
for Early Ruling dated November 17, 1978 was filed with the Cour 
followed by a Request for Ruling dated December 19, 1978. 
On December 29, 1978, Judge Dee handed down his Memo-
randum Decision. After stating it was the Court's opinion that 
appellant had failed to establish a basis upon which her motion: 
could be granted, the Court stated as follows: 
The Court is of the opinion that all the informa-
tion contained in the subsequent Affidavit and all 
of the allegations both pro and con contained in 
Affidavits filed by defendant and Counter-Affidavits 
by plaintiff were well known to the plaintiff and 
her competent counsel prior to the original Decree 
having been entered into on the 19th of May, 1978, 
and also prior to the entering into the Stipulation 
of the 7th of April, 1978. (R. 529) 
After the Memorandum Decision was handed down but 
before any Order was signed by Judge Dee, appellant filed a 
Motion to Modify Divorce Decree and for Leave to Take Deposi-
tions. (R. 566-570) The Motion to Modify was based on the conti 
ing jurisdiction vested in the divorce court by Section 30-3-5, 
U.C.A., 1953, as amended. Said Motion requested that Judge Dee 
consider appellant's prior motions as being motions to modify 
the decree of divorce entered June 22, 1978 and also requested 
that the Court delay ruling thereon and for leave of Court to 
take depositions "In order to determine the full facts and true 
holdings and earnings of the defendant for the guidance of the 
Court." (R. 567) This Motion was filed on January 25, 1979 
and was in effect denied by Judge Dee. 
-10-
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An Amended Judgment and Order was signed by Judge Dee 
and filed January 31, 1979. Appellant filed her Notice of 
Appeal on February 27, 1979. 
The preceding procedural over-view was given in an 
attempt to show the status of this matter before Judge Dee 
entered his Order denying the relief sought by appellant. 
B. Facts learned after divorce as compared with 
respondent's representations at time bf divorce 
As was stated above, appellant sought relief from 
the lower court for fraud she alleges was perpetrated on her 
and the court below. Because of the inherent difficulty in 
showing fraud, appellant considers it essential to set forth 
the operative facts showing fraud in the detail as hereafter 
set forth. 
In his Response to Written Interrogatories filed 
February 1, 1978, respondent delivered to appellant a Financial 
Statement dated April 30, 1977 and which was originally given to 
Zions First National Bank. Said Financial Statement shows respon-
dent as having a net worth of $814,637.39 with total assets of 
$962,367.43. (R.78 and Defendant's Exhibit 7) 
On the date of the divorce trial, April 17, 1978, 
respondent represented to the Court and to the appellant that he 
had total assets of $300,000.00 and debts of $100,000.00. This 
situation was confirmed to this Court on April 16, 1979 when in 
oral arguments on a motion in this matter, respondent's counsel 
on behalf of respondent made the following statement: 
-11-
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When the decree of divorce was entered, 
basically you were dealing with a total balance 
sheet of $300,000 in assets and $100,000 in 
liabilities. (Transcribed from tape recording 
of proceedings before the Supreme Court on April 
16, 1979, Law and Motion Calendar) 
Appellant relied on the representations of respondent 
in deciding whether to enter into the offered settlement. Had 
these representations been true, the settlement agreed on which 
awarded appellant $98,000 as property distribution and $2,000 
lump-sum alimony for a total of $100,000 cash, and which left 
respondent -with the assets and liabilities of the parties, 
would indeed have been just and equitable. Judge Dee in ex-
plaining his unwillingness to award attorney's fees even charac 
terized the settlement as "the handsome settlement you got." 
(R. 241) However, as the following discussion will point out, 
the settlement was far from "handsome" and in fact grossly 
inequitable and unjust. 
According to the testimony of appellant at the 
October 17, 1978 hearing, respondent's representation on April 
7, 1978 that his net worth was only $200,000 was made and substr 
tiated in the following fashion: 
(1) On or about April 7, 1978 respondent supplied 
appellant with a document entitled "Contract and Agreement" and 
a document entitled "Addendum Number One." (Plaintiff's Exhibit 
2 and 3, respectively) The Contract and Agreement indicated tha 
on December 1, 1975 respondent sold his interest in all of his 
corporations to his parents, Milan C. and D. Noriene C. Boyce, 
-12-
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"for $10.00 and other valuable consideration." Addendum Number 
One modifies some of the terms of the original Contract and 
Agreement but indicates that on February 1, 1977, respondent's 
parents were still the owners of the corporations. Likewise, 
in "answer" to an Order Compelling Answers, respondent supplied 
to appellant a single typed page indicating that he no longer 
owned any stock in any of the corporations he had organized. 
(Plaintiff's Exhibit 1) 
Appellant testified on October 17th that the first 
time she saw Plaintiff's Exhibits 2 and 3 was within a few days 
before the April 7, 1978 hearing. She further testified that 
although she was listed as Secretary-Treasurer of the corporations 
for some years, she had no knowledge of the transfer of corporate 
ownership from respondent to his parents. (R. 834-387) The 
effect of these representations was to lead appellant to believe 
on April 7, 1978 that although the Financial Statement of April 
30, 1977 indicated that respondent owned the corporations and 
had a net worth in excess of $800,000, as a result of the trans-
fer of corporate ownership he no longer owned those assets. 
(2) Appellant and respondent jointly owned ten 
~ acre lots in the Dimple Dell Oaks Subdivision in Salt Lake 
County. Within a few days before the April 7, 1978 divorce 
hearing, respondent delivered to appellant a certified appraisal 
dated March 13, 1978. (Plaintiff's Exhibit 4) According to that 
appraisal each lot had an estimated value of $4,650 for a total 
value of the property of $46,500. (R. 809-810) Thus respondent 
-13-
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represented to and appellant acted upon the belief that said 
property had only a value of $46,500. 
( ~' J) The personal residence of the parties was repre-
sented by respondent to have a market value of $100,000 with 
encumbrances of $83,463 ($54,368 to Zions Bank and $39,095 to 
American Concrete Construction, Inc.). (R. 66) · This left an 
equity of $16,537. 
(4) Appellant and respondent jointly held property 
located at 1295 East 4800 South in Salt Lake City. In his 
answers to Interrogatories respondent represented the value 
of the property to be $55,000 with encumbrances totalling 
$63,055 ($40,000 to Zions Bank and $32,055 to Rhea B. Jacobs 
Groves Estate). (R. 66) Within a few days prior to the April 7, 
1978 divorce hearing respondent delivered to appellant a cer-
tified appraisal report dated March 13, 1978 which gave as the 
value of the property $65,000. (Plaintiff's Exhibit 5) 
All of the foregoing information which was given to 
appellant by respondent seemed to support respondent's repre-
sentation that on April 7, 1978 he had total assets of $300,000 
with liabilities of $100,000 for a net worth of $200,000. 
However, as also shown by the testimony at the hearing 
of October 17, 1978, some time in May, 1978 respondent atternptei 
to borrow approximately $100,000 from the Lockhart Company and 
in connection with this loan application gave Lockhart a Finan-
cial Statement dated May 1, 1978. (Plaintiff's Exhibit 8) That 
Statement showed the following: 
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(1) Respondent included as his own the assets of the 
corporations he had purportedly sold to his parents. On cross-
examination of Thomas Pike, Vice-President of The Lockhart Com-
pany, counsel for respondent asked if Mr. Boyce hadn't informed 
him that the.Financial_Statement included total Boyce family 
assets. Mr. Pike, who dealt with respondent, testified that 
he did not recall that any of the assets listed on the State-
ment were assets of others than the respondent. (R. 840-841) 
When Mr. Pike was asked what the Lockhart Company considered 
respondent's net worth to be, he answerd, "I would say the 
figure on the financial statement Lof May7." (R. 844) 
(2) The May 1 Financial Statement shows a fair market 
value of $250,000 for the ten ~ acre lots in Dimple Dell Oaks. 
Mr. Pike of the Lockhart Company testified on October 17 that his 
company had the lots appraised and made a loan based on the 
value of the property being $260,000. (R. 846-847) Thus on 
May 1, 1978 respondent represented to Lockhart and Lockhart 
found the value of these lots to be in excess of five times 
what respondent had represented their value to be on April 7, 
1978, three weeks earlier. The Financial Statement of May 1 
also reflects that the liens in favor of American Concrete 
Construction, Inc. were no longer on the property. 
In this regard it should be noted that respondent was 
President of American Concrete Construction, Inc. Release of 
all liens in the name of that corporation immediately following 
the divorce of the parties must indicate to an impartial observer 
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that the presence of said liens in the course of the divorce 
proceeding was a sham and a fraud upon the court and the appella 
(3) In the May 1 statement the former residence of 
the parties is listed as having a market value of $150,000. A 
mortgage in the sum of $35,728.32 is listed. The liens in favor 
of American Concrete Construction, Inc., again, no longer encum· 
ber the property. 
(4) The property located at 1295 East 4800 South is 
listed in the May 1 Statement as having a market value of $125,( 
with a mortgage of $11,502.50. Thus respondent represented 
to Lockhart on Xa.1 ::., 1978 this piece of property to have a 
value double that which he represented to appellant three 
weeks earlier on April 7, 1978. 
The Financial Statement of May 1, 1978 reflects 
respondent's net worth as being $1,154,690.10 with total assets 
of $1,383,920.92. This is a considerable improvement over his 
financial status approximately three weeks earlier when he 
represented to appellant and the trial court a net worth of 
$200,000 with total assets of $300,000. 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE EVIDENCE IN THE CASE AT BAR 
SHOWS SUCH AN ABUSE OF DISCRETION 
ON THE PART OF THE TRIAL COURT IN 
DENYING APPELLANT'S RULE 60(b) 
MOTION AND MOTION TO MODIFY DECREE 
THAT THIS COURT SHOULD REVERSE AND 
REMAND WITH DIRECTIONS TO SET ASIDE 
THE DECREE OF DIVORCE AND REOPEN 
THE CASE ON THE ISSUES OF PROPERTY 
DIVISION, ALIMONY AND CHILD SUPPORT 
A divorce action is a proceeding in equity. Iverson 
v. Iverson, 526 P.2d 1126 (Utah 1974). It follows that a Motion 
to Modify a divorce decree must be considered an equitable matter. 
Indeed it is submitted that a Rule 60(b) Motion such as that 
initially brought by appellant is an equitable matter. 
This Court has the responsibility to review the 
evidence in a case in equity. Article VIII, Section 9 Utah 
State Constitution; Section 78-2-2, U.C.A., 1953, as amended; 
Rule 72(a), U.R.C.P.; Nokes v. Continental Mining & Milling Co., 
6 Utah 2d 177, 178, 308 P.2d 954 (1957). 
The weight to be given by this Court to the findings 
of the trial court has been stated in various ways. The following 
statement is found in the case of Richins v. Struhs, 17 Utah 2d 356, 
412 P.2d 314 (1966): 
. . . It is the duty and the prerogative of 
this court to review both the law and the 
facts and to consider the weight and suffi-
ciency of the evidence. However, in such cases 
we make allowance for the advantages the trial 
court has because of proximity to the parties, 
the witnesses and the trial. (Footnotes omitted) 
(17 Utah 2d at 358) 
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In referring specifically to a situation involving 
a requested modification of a divorce ;decree this Court in 
Harding v. Harding, 26 Utah 2d 277, 280, 488 P.2d 308 (1971), 
stated: 
This proceeding seeking to modify the 
divorce decree is in equity; and it is the 
prerogative of this court to review the 
evidence, to make its own findings, and to 
substitute its judgment for that of the trial 
court when the ends of justice so require. 
However, due to the prerogatives and advan-
taged position of the trial court, we pursue 
that broad authorization under certain rules 
of review which are now well established: 
Its actions are indulged with a presumption 
of validity and correctness and the burden 
is upon the appellant to show a basis for 
upsetting them: either (1) that findings 
have been made when the evidence clearl 
preponderates the other way; or that 
there has been a misunderstanding or mis-
applicEcion of the law resulting in sub-
stantia] a~d prejudicial error; or (3) that 
it abpears plainly that there has been SUCh 
an a use of discretion that an ine uit or 
injustice has resulted. Emphasis added 
(Footnotes omitted) 
More recently in the case of Ingram v. Forrer, 
563 P.2d 181, 183 (Utah 1977) this Court stated: 
While in equity cases we accord due 
regard to the position of a trial judge in 
making his findings of fact, we are not 
required to affirm him where it appears 
that he has erred. (Citing, Article VIII, 
Sec. 9, Utah State Constitution; First Security 
Bank of Utah v. Demiris, 10 Utah 2d 405, 354 P.2d 
97 (1960); Wiese v. Wiese, 24 Utah 2d 236, 469 
P.2d 504 (1970)) 
In the case of Kettner v. Snow, 13 Utah 2d 382, 384, 
375 P.2d 28 (1962), Mr. Justice Crockett writing for this Court 
stated: 
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We are in accord with the proposition 
urged by the defendant that~the trial court 
has broad discretion in granting new trials· 
and in allowing relief under Rule 60(b). ' 
But its power is not without limitation and 
can~ot be exercised capriciously or arbitrarily. 
It ~s elementary that under usual circumstances 
the regular rules of procedure are binding, and 
that a party who has allowed the time to move 
for a new trial to expire is thereafter pre-
cluded from doing so. This can be avoided only 
where it is made to appear that for one or more 
of the reasons specified in Rule 60(b) justice 
ha~ been so thwarted that equity and good con-
sc~ence demand that this extraordinary relief be 
granted. And the burden of showing facts to 
justify doing so is upon him who seeks such relief. 
It is respectfully submitted that when this Court 
reviews the evidence, it will be abundantly clear that the trial 
court erred in that ''it appears plainly that there has been such 
an abuse of discretion that an inequity or injustice has resulted." 
A review of the record in the case at bar shows that 
respondent through trickery, misrepresentations and fraud accom-
plished his purpose of obtaining a grossly inequitable propor-
tion of the assets of the parties. His plan seems to have been 
to (1) transfer all of his corporate holdings to members of 
his family while maintaining complete control of those assets and 
all without the knowledge of appellant, and (2) encumber all 
jointly held property while understating the true value thereof. 
This inequitable and plainly fraudulent conduct was 
pointed out to the trial court. It was an abuse of discretion 
for the trial court to refuse to correct this inequity. An 
injustice had been done and the trial court refused to do equity. 
Therefore this Court should reverse the trial court and remand 
this case with directions to reopen the divorce on the issue 
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of property settlement, alimony and child support. Furthermore, 
the appellant should be permitted to make use of the full range 
of discovery devices in order to present the true status of 
respondent's financial condition to the trial court. 
POINT II 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN CONSIDERING 
THE AFFIDAVITS OF RESPONDENT IN THE 
FACE OF DIRECT EVIDENCE ADDUCED BY 
APPELLANT AT THE OCTOBER 17 HEARING 
As was stated under Point I above, the evidence put 
on by appellant at the October 17 hearing was the only evidence 
that was actually presented to the trial court. At the end 
of the October 1- hearing appellant had additional witnesses 
waiting to tes::J. :'y. 
Respondent has never offered any competent material 
evidence in rebuttal to the evidence adduced by appellant at 
the October 17 hearing. Instead, respondent submitted a volu-
minous, rambling, largely irrelevant affidavit. This affidavit 
cannot be considered as evidence in the face of testimony by 
witnesses in open court because appellant was not afforded the 
right to cross-examine any of the affiants connected with said 
affidavit. This Court has recognized that the right to cross-
examine is a valuable right. Hunter v. Michaelis,ll4 Utah 242, 
198 P.2d 245, 251 (1948). 
Furthermore, jurisdictions which have considered 
the question have uniformly held that, at least in the absence 
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of a statute permitting it, affidavits are not competent 
evidence to establish the facts contained therein. See, e.g., 
Holton v. Laucomer, 504 P.2d 872 (Hawaii 1972); Crabtree v. 
Measday, 508 P.2d 1317 (N.M. App. 1973), cert. den. 508 P.2d 
1302; Caye v. Caye, 211 P.2d 252 (Nev. 1949). 
Professor Wigmore states at Section 1384 in the Third 
Edition of his treatise on evidence: 
Upon the principles already examined, 
it is clear that a mere affidavit- i.e. a 
statement made upon oath before an officer 
--is inadmissible .... 
A case very similar to the one at bar in which the 
issue of the admissibility of affidavits was decided is Pavaroff 
v. Pavaroff, 130 P.2d 212 (Cal. App. 1942). That case involved 
a motion to modify a divorce decree with respect to custody of 
minor children. The trial court denied the motion based not 
only on the oral testimony of witnesses but on affidavits which it 
had received in evidence over objection. In reversing the trial 
£c~ 
court for receiving the affidavits in the ~ of oral testi-
mony by the other party, the reviewing court stated: 
It is elemental that the issue below, 
pertaining as it did solely to the custody 
of minor children, could not have been tried 
wholly or in part on affidavits in the ori-
ginal divorce proceeding, over objection. 
This for the reason that evidence by way of 
affidavit on controverted issues of fact is 
an inappropriate link in the chain of proof. 
From time immemorial it has been a fundamental 
precept of the common law that testimony to 
sustain a cause of action, a defense thereto 
or any other issuable controverted fact must 
-21-
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
be given in open court or by deposition 
with cross-examination then and there 
accorded. Where cross-examination was 
not accorded, not only was the testimony 
classed as being hearsay but it was con-
sidered too uncertain and unreliable to 
be considered in the investigation of 
controverted facts, and should therefore 
not be received as evidence. As an affi-
davit is but the ex parte sworn state-
ment or testimony of the affiant, it was 
acco~dingly inadmissible at the common 
law on a controverted issue of fact. 
* * * 
In short, the common law, accepting the 
experience of ages, regarded cross-exami-
nation of a witness or affiant as to his 
relation to the case or parties, his 
motives, if any, his means of knowledge 
and opportunities for information, his 
powers of observation and tenacity of 
T.emcc'" as ::>f prime importance to test 
"hE :=edibility and accuracy of his state-
ments, so as to render reliance thereon 
safe. (130 P.2d at 213) 
Appellant objected to the use of respondent's affi-
davits as evidence. On November 4, 1978 appellant wrote to the 
Honorable Judge Dee regarding possible use of affidavits by the 
respondent saying, "If the defendant had evidence for the Court 
he should properly have submitted it in form other than affidavi 
(Appendix 2) Again in her Request for Ruling dated December 19, 
1978, respondent stated: 
. . . the plaintiff believes the "Answer and 
Counter Affidavits to Plaintiff's Affidavit 
in Support of Motion for Relief from Final 
Decree," consisting of approximately one 
hundred fifty pages filed by the defendant 
with the Court on or about the 6th or 7th 
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d~y of December, 1978, contains multiple 
mlsstatements and untruths and constitutes 
an attempt by the defendant to get evidence 
before the Court without taking the stand 
under oath and without permitting the op-
portunity of cross examination. (R. 531 
Appendix 3) ' 
Utah's Rules of Civil Procedure allow for the use 
of affidavits only in fairly limited circumstances. Affidavits 
may be used in regard to motions for summary judgment (Rule 56(e)); 
application for new trial (Rule~(c)); disqualification of a judge 
(Rule 63(b)); provisional and final remedies (Rules 64A, 64B, 
64C, 64D and 71B); and appeals by indigents (Rule 73(c)). 
On August 1, 1978, faced with an accelerated hearing 
date, appellant submitted an affidavit. (R. 182) However, she 
y-·?t--{,\'!_,,1.. 
had witnesses present whom the Court re~~eseed to hear. (R. 750) 
On October 17, 1978 appellant presented evidence both 
by way of testimony in open court and documents, identified and 
received in evidence as Exhibits. Appellant's witnesses were 
subject to cross-examination by respondent. Respondent failed 
to put on evidence of any kind. It is clear that the trial 
court relied heavily on the matters contained in respondent's 
affidavits in deciding whether the motions should be granted. 
To do so was error, an abuse of discretion, and prejudicial to 
appellant. 
It is therefore respectfully submitted that this case 
should be remanded to the trial court with instructions to reopen 
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the divorce proceedings on the question of what is a fair and 
equitable property settlement becween the parties. 
POINT III 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ORDERING 
APPELLANT TO REMOVE THE LIS PENDENS 
SHE HAD FILED IN CONNECTION WITH 
THE CASE AT BAR 
On or about July 31, 1978, appellant filed for record 
a Notice of Lis Pendens pursuant to Section 78-40-2, Utah Code 
Annotated, 1953, as amended. Said Notice applied to the three 
properties held in joint tenancy by appellant and respondent 
during their marriage and was necessary because appellant had 
Quit-Claimed her interest in said properties to the respondent 
pursuant to the ~cree 8f Divorce. Said properties included the 
family residence on Top-of-the-World Drive, the ten lots in 
Dimple Dell Oaks Subdivision and the property located at 1295 
East 4800 South. (R. 214-215) 
Section 78-40-2 provides in pertinent part: 
In any action affecting the title to, or the 
right of possession of, real property the 
plaintiff at the time of filing the complaint 
or thereafter . . . may file for record with 
the recorder of the county in which the pro-
perty or some part thereof is situated a 
notice of the pendency of the action .... 
From the time of filing such notice for 
record only shall a purchaser or encumbrancer 
of the property affected thereby be deemed to 
have constructive notice of the pendency of 
the action, and only of its pendency against 
parties designated by their real names. 
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Although the Utah Supreme Court has not addressed 
the issue, the courts of other jurisdictions have found that a 
divorce action is a proper subject for a notice of lis pendens. 
The Colorado Supreme Court adopted this position by analogizing 
to a prior Colorado case involving a suit for separate mainte-
nance in the case of Clopine v. Kemper, 344 P.2d 451 (1959). The 
Oklahoma Supreme Court came to the same conclusion in the case 
of Bowman v. Bowman, 206 P.2d 582 (1949). 
In Utah, the district courts have jurisdiction to hear 
divorce suits. Section 30-3-5 of the Utah Code Annotated gives 
the district courts power to "make such orders in relation to 
the . . . property . . . of the parties . as may be equitable." 
The district court is also given continuing jurisdiction with 
respect to "the distribution of property ... " Hence, in Utah 
a divorce action must be considered an action "affecting the 
title to, or the right of possession of, real property." 
In the case of Hansen v. Kohler, 550 P.2d 186, 190 
(Utah 1976), the Utah Supreme Court stated: 
The sole purpose of recording a notice of 
lis pendens is to give constructive notice of 
the pendency of the proceeding; its only founda-
tion is in the action filed--it has no existence 
independent of it. 
Both Section 78-40-2 and the Hansen case make it 
clear that so long as an action is pending, that action will 
support a lis pendens. Black's Law Dictionary, Fourth Edition, 
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defines "pendency" as follows: 
Suspense; the state of being pendent.or undecided; 
the state of an action, etc., after 1t has been 
begun, and before the final disposition of it. 
(emphasis added) 
It is a settled rule in Utah that a judgment, and 
hence an action, is not final until the time for appeal has 
expired or an appeal timely taken has been disposed of. The 
Supreme Court in Young v. Hansen, 117 Utah 607, 218 P.2d 674, 
675 (1950) stated: 
In the cases of State Bank of Sevier v. American 
Cement and Plaster Co., 80 Utah 250, 10 P.2d 1065; 
Vance v. Heath, 42 Utah 148, 129 P 365; and Schramm 
- Johnson Drugs v. Kleeb, 51 Utah 159, 169 P 161, 
this court held that a judgment is not final pending 
appeal . 
This rule is seQe7alized in 51 AmJur 2d, Lis Pendens, Section 32 
as follows: 
Under what may be designated as a general 
rule that is subject to exceptions, once the 
doctrine of lis pendens comes into operation in 
connection with particular litigation, it remains 
in operation until the rendition of a final de-
cision that puts a definite end to the litigation. 
(citing, inter alia, Dupee v. Salt Lake Valley 
Loan and Trust Company, 20 Utah 103, 57 P 845) 
The instant matter is in all respects still "pending" 
hence the lis pendens filed in connection herewith fully complie 
with the law. That being the case it was error and an abuse of 
discretion for the trial court to order the appellant to with-
draw and cancel the lis pendens she has recorded in connection 
with this action. 
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POINT IV 
THE TRIAL COURT WAS IN NO WAY 
BOUND BY THE SETTLEMENT AGREE-
MENT ENTERED INTO BY THE PARTIES 
BUT HAD A RESPONSIBILITY TO DO ' 
EQUITY 
The divorce court as a court of equity had a duty to 
see that equity was done insofar as the distribution of the 
marital assets and the setting of alimony. 
This Court speaking through Mr. Justice Maughan in 
Strong v. Strong, 548 P.2d 626, 627 (1976) stated: 
In Callister v. Callister, /I Utah 2d 34, 
41, 261 P.2d 944 (19531/, this court stated 
that Section 30-3-5, U.C.A. 1953, gave the 
Courts power to disregard the stipulations 
or agreements of the parties and enter judgment 
for such alimony or child support as appeared 
reasonable; to modify such judgments when a 
change of circumstances justified it; regardless 
of attempts of the parties to control the mat-
ter by contract. 
Likewise, Mr. Justice Crockett in Klein v. Klein, 
544 P.2d 472, 476 (1975), stated: 
It is the established rule that a stipulation 
pertaining to matters of divorce, custody and 
property rights therein, though advisory upon 
the court and would usually be followed unless 
the court thought it unfair or unreasonable, 
is not necessarily binding on the court anyway. 
It is only a recommendation to be adhered to 
if the court believes it to be fair and rea-
sonable. (Citing ogenshaw v. Olenshaw, 102 
Utah 22, 126 P.2d 1 68, and Cal ister) 
Mr. Justice Crockett also stated in Mathie v. Mathie, 
12 Utah 2d 116, 123, 363 P.2d 779 (1961): 
The parties cannot by contract completely 
defeat the authority expressly conferred upon 
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the court by our statute, Sec. 30-3-5, 
U.C.A. 1953, in cases of divorce, to 
"make such orders in relation to * * * 
property*** as may be equitable." 
Under it there can be no doubt of the 
court's prerogative to make whatever 
disposition of the property, including 
the rights in such a contract, as it 
deems fair, equitable and necessary 
for the protection and welfare of the 
parties. 
Based on the duty imposed by Section 30-3-5 and the 
record in the case at bar, it is clear (1) that the court was 
prevented from performing its duty at the time of the Divorce 
by the misrepresentations of the defendant, and (2) that the 
lower court abused its discretion by refusing to set aside the 
Decree of Divorce as it related to property distribution, alimon; 
and child supp~r:. 
This Court has gone so far as to direct a decree which 
it considers just and equitable in situations where the trial 
court has failed to do equity. In Hendricks v. Hendricks, 63 
P.2d 277, 279 (1939) this Court stated: 
.The decree in each case must be determined 
upon the facts, the conditions, and the circum-
stances of the parties in each particular case, 
and that if, upon examination of the record, 
this court is convinced that the award in the 
trial court is inequitable and unjust, it should 
direct such decree as it finds to be just and 
equitable. 
It is respectfully submitted that the trial court's 
refusal to set aside the divorce decree has resulted in an 
unjust and inequitable award. Therefore this Court should 
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reverse the trial court and remand with instructions to set aside 
the decree insofar as the same relates to property distribution, 
alimony and child support, and to permit appellant to proceed 
with the discovery she needs to fully inform the lower court 
of the fraud perpetrated on that court and appellant. 
POINT V 
THE OUTCOME OF THIS APPEAL MAY 
DECIDE WHETHER APPELLANT WILL 
EVER BE ABLE TO OBTAIN RELIEF 
FOR THE FRAUD PERPETRATED ON HER 
Because of the trial court's refusal to grant the 
relief requested by appellant, appellant filed a Complaint in 
the Third Judicial District Court, Civil No. C79-1221, on 
February 22, 1979. (R. 692-734) That case is captioned Doreen 
Boyce v. Insulation Corporation of America, et al. That action 
is one for fraud and conspiracy and is an attempt to show the 
involvement of respondent's corporations, elderly parents and 
elderly aunt in putting respondent's assets and property beyond 
the reach of appellant. Since the Honorable Judge Dee had by 
his Order in the divorce action closed the door to the discovery 
required by appellant, it was intended that the fraud action would 
permit appellant to pursue such discovery in order to establish 
the extent of her damage. 
However, the defendants in that action have been able 
to convince the District Court to set aside scheduled depositions 
and stay proceedings until this case is decided on appeal. This 
-29-
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
is more particularly set forth in the petition filed with this 
Court of Doreen Boyce, plaintiff, for leave to file an inter-
mediate appeal from Order staying proceedings in Civil No. 
C79-1221 and consolidate same with this appeal now pending, and 
defendants' Response thereto, one of which defendants is respon-
dent here. 
It is emphasized that the testimony put on by appel-
lant at the hearing of October 17, 1978 was intended only to 
make a sufficient showing of fraud to allow the trial court to 
reopen the divorce. It was expected that if reopened, this 
would allow the discovery necessary to fully inform the court 
of the nature and extent of the respondent's true assets and the 
fraud perpetra~ed on the court and appellant. The October 17 
hearing was not intended to, and it did not, amount to formal 
proof of common law fraud. 
The Honorable Judge Dee on August 1, 1978 had ruled 
the Divorce to be set aside and the parties restored to the 
economic status quo as of April 7, 1978 on the mere represen-
tation by counsel of what appellant's affidavit showed. 
On October 17, 1978, the appellant reduced the con-
tents of that affidavit to substantive evidence found in testi-
mony and Exhibits. No other or additional testimony was deemed 
to be necessary at that time and indeed the full nature and 
extent of the fraud cannot be determined without the opportunity 
of discovery. 
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The respondent should not be permitted to retain the 
disproportionate distribution of marital assets he received 
through fraud, connivance and misrepresentation. If the ruling 
of Honorable David B. Dee is allowed to stand the appellant 
will be unable to secure relief and her equitable share of the 
marital estate in the divorce action itself. Furthermore, that 
ruling if allowed to stand and become final will undoubtedly be 
urged as a bar to appellant's action in D. Boyce v. Insulation 
Corporation of America, et al. Civil No. C79-1221. (See Petition 
for leave to appeal from order staying proceedings and to con-
solidate same with this case on appeal and Response thereto~ 
CONCLUSION 
It is respectfully submitted that the foregoing analysis 
has shown that the trial court abused its discretion in failing 
to reopen the divorce and/or modify the decree after opportunity 
for discovery on the questions of property distribution, alimony 
and child support. This Honorable Court should therefore reverse 
the trial court and remand with instructions to reopen the di-
vorce on the issues stated above and to permit the appellant to 
proceed with discovery. 
Respectfully submitted, 
BAYLE, CHILD & RITCHIE 
/S/ 
R. M. Child 
Attorneys for Appellant 
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The following is taken from the transcript of the 
hearing of September 8, 1978, to show that the lower court, 
counsel for appellant and counsel for respondent each assumed 
that discovery could not proceed until the divorce decree had 
been set aside: 
MR. SHIELDS: What I would like to know procedurally, 
how is the plaintiff before this Court to take any depositions? 
There are some limitations to taking depositions. 
THE COURT: Well, by the dismissal of the of the appea 
MR. SHIELDS: There is a Decree. 
THE COURT: Then--then this Court has continuing juris 
diction over tnis matter after the Decree is entered. 
MR. SHIELDS: Right. 
THE COURT: And to Rule 60(b), if there's a proper 
showing that there is reason for us to look at the Decree on 
the grounds of one of those subparagraphs which you claim. Then 
of course, I'd look at it in terms of setting it aside, modify~ 
or whatever. So I guess the next move is to file a motion, and 
maybe what you have already done highlights that, to look at it 
as a 60(b) motion. 
MR. SHIELDS: There's nothing--that's correct. There' 
nothing before the Court now. 
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THE COURT: I'm telling Mr. Childs (sic) if there isn't, 
that's what you do. If I grant it, you take depositions. * * * 
(R. 781-82) 
MR. CHILD: 60(b), I think we have properly brought 
before the Court, but Mr. Shields points out the problem. The 
rules say that depositions may be taken after judgment only 
by leave of Court for purposes of preserving testimony. 
MR. SHIELDS: Right. 
MR. CHILD: I think that's what he had in mind when he 
said you do have some limitations on depositions. But if the 
Court gave assurance I could use the depositions to explore--
THE COURT: Uh-huh. 
MR. CHILD: If Mr. Shields is going to object to that, 
then we're going to have a lot of troubles and so forth, so I 
assume. 
Now, if I might point out to the Court this. I do not 
accept the fact that this Court lost jurisdiction until that 
record went up on appeal--
THE COURT: I understand. 
MR. CHILD: --because this Court had the right to grant 
an extension of I think up to two months beyond the forty days 
for the record to go up on appeal for purposes of doing things 
the Court required in the case. 
MR. SHIELDS: Only--
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MR. CHILD: Now--
MR. SHIELDS: --there's a limitation on that. And I 
have the rule before me. There is a limitation only for the 
purpose, Your Honor, of doing whatever needs to be done or 
corrected to make the appeal proper. You see Mr. Child has for· 
gotten part of the--part of the rule. But that's what it says, 
because I have it in front of me. (Indicating.) 
MR. CHILD: That may be. 
MR. SHILEDS: That is. 
MR. CHILD: That may be. The point I'm getting at, 
though, Your Honor, is this. I don't believe that the August ls' 
ruling of the Court would be beyond the Court's power. 
THE COURT: Uh-huh. 
MR. CHILD: And if that ruling stands, it was really 
accomplishing exactly what everybody needs. And that was the 
Decree was set aside. At that point discovery could be started 
again, unlimited discovery could start again, and that's what we 
really need right now in order to properly put the parties back 
in the positions they were on April 7th and protect interest pn 
blems and things of this type. I think we could all move with 
dispatch. 
MR. SHIELDS: But the order has been set aside. All 
I'm saying, if the Court please, Mr. Child is not before this 
Court. There is a final Decree. And the only thing--if he 
withdraws the appeal, the only thing he's in front of the Court 
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with is a motion to reform the decree, which you have indicated 
is improper and it's not there. Now, this is equivalent, as I 
see it, to some lawyers coming in, they get a decree, the whole 
thing is over with, final, ended, the decree is signed. All 
of a sudden you get a notification from one of the counsel 
we're going to start taking depositions. That can't be done, 
you see. 
MR. CHILD: That's the problem. 
MR. SHIELDS: Well, it can't be. There's nothing be-
fore the Court. 
MR. CHILD: That's the problem, but once vacated it's 
before the Court. 
THE COURT: Under 60--
MR. CHILD: Yes. Once vacated--
THE COURT: --if I grant that? 
MR. CHILD: Once the Notice of Appeal is vacated it's 
before the Court, but I don't think we can proceed with deposi-
tions until the Court rules the Decree bas been set aside in 
order to reevaluate the property distribution, so--
MR. SHIELDS: But we're missing--I'm sorry. We're 
missing one point. We're missing one point. 
MR. CHILD: I think we better get it. 
MR. SHIELDS: All right. If the Court sets aside--
if he dismisses his appeal obviously this Court then has 
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continuing jurisdiction from hence forward. I don't think we're 
in any dispute on that. But the problem is that you just can't 
go out and take deposit ions on a divorce case that's a -month old 
a year old or five years old, without getting before this Court 
with some kind of a motion and the only thing which I have the 
right to resist. And the only thing he has at this moment upon 
which to predicate taking depositions is a motion to reform the 
Decree which motion this Court has already decided is improper. 
MR. CHILD: Oh, it's--the motion is entitled Motion 
for Relief From Judgment, as I recall, or Final Decree. 
MR. SHIELDS: Well--
MR. CHILD: Motion for Relief From Final Decree. It'> 
obviously brought under Rule 60. If the designation was somewha 
inartful, it doesn't deprive the Court from the motion. *** 
(R. 783-86) (All emphasis added) 
Likewise, from the transcript of the hearing of 
October 17, 1978, the following passages reflect the fact it 
was still considered necessary to set·aside the decree before 
discovery could proceed: 
MR. CHTI.D: I think his last testimony has illustratec 
something. I'm being forced to use the Court's time for purposE 
of discovery, and I have Milan C. Boyce in the hall. If the Co\ 
is inclined, and once we get over this hurdle, once the Court L 
it does, sets aside in part the decree so we are actually look~ 
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into what the property interests are, then we can proceed with 
depositions, but the rules don't allow depositions until that's 
been opened up for that purpose. And so I think an orderly de-
velopment dictates that both Mrs. Boen and the Boyces, Sr., really 
shouldn't take the Court's time the way we are doing it this 
afternoon. 
THE COURT: Well, this is a matter of discovery. And 
youre saying until I open this up to see whether or not, and 
that would have to be on the basis of the fact Mrs. Boyce did 
not know or misunderstood or didn't understand what the real 
property was, then I can open that up. 
MR. CHILD: Not just the real property. Corporate 
property. 
THE COURT: Really what the property was. I didn't 
mean real property in the legal sense. 
MR. CHILD: I see. 
THE COURT: The amount of the property Mr. Boyce had 
control of, if she had that matter misrepresented to her at the 
time she agreed in stipulation, then, of course, I must consider 
that, if that's the situation. 
Why don't you, at this juncture at least, get ready to 
meet, Mr. Child, Mr. Shields' objection to opening this up, be-
cause he apparently has some law on it. 
MR SHIELDS: I--
THE COURT: And why don't you brief that to the Court 
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in response by Mr. Child, and I'll look at at and then I will 
have another hearing on whether I'm going to open it up after 
I hear those arguments. *** (R. 886-87) (Emphasis added) 
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Honorable D.:1vid B. Dee 
.Judge 
Thi~ District Cour-t 
New Cou~ts Sui ldlng 
250 EAst Fou~th South 
Novennbe~ 14, 1G78 
Salt Lake Clty, Utah 84111 
Re: Boyce v. Boyce 
D-26810 
De a~ .Judge Dee: 
In its delibe~atlons on the matte~ nOIN before tho Court ln 
the above-captioned case, we assume that the Court ls not 
conslde~ing a "Counter Affidavit" by the defendant, ~t'erred t:) 
at page nine of ~f'endant's memorandum dated Octobe~ 25, 1978, 
The plalntlt'l' has neve~ been served a copy of such "Counter 
Affidavit" and would have no Idea of Its contents. 
If the defendant had evidence fo~ the C:>urt he should 
properly have submitted lt in fo~m othe~ than a"idavlt. 
Respectfully, 
R, M, O,lld 
RMC:lc 
cc: .Jed Shields 
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R. M. CHILD 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
1200 Beneficial Life Tower 
36 South State Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 363-2091 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRIC1 COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY, 
STATE OF UTAH 
NINA DOREEN DAVIS BOYCE, 
Plaintiff, REQUEST FOR RULING 
v. 
MILAN MACK BOYCE, Civil No. D-26810 
Defendant. 
Plaintiff respectfully requests the above Honorable 
Court that a ruling be entered in this matter on plaintiff's 
Motion to Set Aside Decree and for Relief from Final Decree 
based upon the evidence which was received by the Court in open 
hEqring on the 17th day of October, 1978. This request is made 
upon the ground and for the reason that the plaintiff believes 
the "Answer and Counter Affidavits to Plaintiff's Affidavit in 
Support of Motion for Relief from Final Decree:• consisting of 
approximately one hundred fifty pages filed by the defendant 
with the Court on or about the 6th or 7th day of December, 1978, 
contains multiple misstatements and untruths and constitutes an 
attempt by the defendant to get evidence before the Court with-
out taking the stand under oath and without permitting the 
opportunity of cross-examination. Furthermore, the contents of 
said Affidavits are in nearly every respect irrelevant to the 
issue before the Court on plaintiff's Motion to Set Aside Decree. 
Evidence was presented by the plaintiff to the Court 
on the 17th day of October, 1978, that at the time of the 
Stipulation and entering of the Divorce Decree herein the 
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plaintiff had been misled by the defendant and his counsel im-
mediately prior to said hearing as to the values of the real 
property of the parties and as to the extent of ownership of 
the defendant in and to his corporations and their respective 
assets. 
Defendant has offered no probative testimony nor any 
testimony wherein he would be subject to cross-examination which 
would explain or excuse the defendant's conduct in misleading 
the plaintiff and her attorney at the time scheduled for the 
hearing of divorce as to the values of the properties or the 
~ership of defendant's interests in his corporations. 
A prompt ruling is requested by the plaintiff for the 
reason that the defendant has made no payments to the plaintiff 
for the support of the minor children of the parties since pay-
ments made to cover the month of August, 1978, notwithstanding 
the approach of Christmas, 1978, and further notwithstanding the 
fact that on the 17th day of November, 1978, a copy of the 
plaintiff's former "Request for Early Ruling" was mailed to 
counsel for.the defendant. 
Lest the Court construe silence on the part of the 
plaintiff to be tacit acceptance of the many misstatements set 
forth in the above-referred one hundred fifty-page document 
filed as an Affidavit by the defendant with "Supporting Affi-
davits," there is attached hereto an Affidavit by the plaintiff 
which does not attempt to negate all of the many misstatements 
and misrepresentations set forth by the defendant, but puts the 
plaintiff on record as advising the Court that she takes ex-
ception to said Affidavits and has a story of her own to tell. 
/
c; 
Respectfully submitted this ____ /__ day of December, 1978. 
R. M. CHILD 
1200 Beneficial Life Tower 
36 South State Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
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